Emerging issues from Bui hydro-power project are suggesting that the experiences of two earlier hydropower projects in Ghana did not succeed in preventing challenges related to resource access and livelihoods. This paper examined the nature of the challenges, their causes, why they were not avoided and the role of the Chinese builders. Forty-three interviews and eleven focus group discussions were conducted and qualitative data analysed by themes using narrative analysis. Our findings show that the livelihoods of the resettled communities on balance are negatively impacted by the construction of the dam. While Chinese dam-builders played a major role in financing and enabling the dam's construction, the Ghanaian governance arrangements were found to be more important in addressing the livelihood challenges.
Introduction
Large dam projects have been built in many countries in the past and a renewed interest in dambuilding has been observed in many developing countries in the last few years. The twentieth century saw rapid increase in the construction of large dams most of them in the industrialized countries. By the end of that century there were over 45,000 large dams in over 140 countries (World Commission on Dams [WCD], 2000) . At the peak of large dam construction, nearly 5,000 large dams were built world-wide in the period from 1970 to 1975 (Tchotsoua et al., 2008) . Dams have been promoted as an important means of meeting perceived needs for water and energy and as long-term strategic investments, which have many additional benefits such as regional development, job creation, industrialisation, agricultural development through irrigation and recreation.
At the forefront of the renaissance of large hydropower dams are the Chinese as the world's largest dam builder and financiers. Sinohydro, a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), is leading the global hydropower sector in terms of number and size of dams built, investment sums and global coverage (Urban and Siciliano, 2014) . While China has a long history of domestic dam-building, recent developments have led to Chinese overseas dam-building, particularly in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) in Asia and Africa (Beck et al., 2012; Bosshard, 2009; International Rivers, 2012; McDonald et al., 2009 ). China's 'Going Out Strategy' encourages overseas investment to access natural resources and to create employment for Chinese workers overseas (McNally et al., 2009; Mohan and Power, 2008) . There are currently more than 330 Chinese-built and Chinese-funded overseas dams, most of them in Southeast Asia (38%) and Africa (26%). The large majority of these are large dams that have been built after 2000 (International Rivers, 2013) , in a time when other dam-building nations and organisations, particularly those from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) withdrew from the dam-building industry.
Africa has had its fair share of large dam building projects even though it is still confronted with a serious deficit in energy supply. Currently, African countries are tapping only about 8% of their technical hydropower potential (IRENA, 2015) . The World Bank has Ghana currently has two large hydroelectric dams: Akosombo, which was commissioned in 1965 and Kpong, in 1982 with a total installed capacity of 1180 MW (Energy Commission, 2012) . Bui is the third large hydroelectric dam with a capacity of 400 MW. The Bui dam is the first dam built by Chinese companies and partly financed by Chinese banks and financiers (Obour et al., 2015) . However, very little research has been conducted on the livelihood challenges of resettled communities affected by dams in Ghana and the role of Chinese dambuilders. This paper therefore aims to address these issues by investigating the Bui dam. The overall objective of this paper is to discuss the emerging livelihood challenges associated with the implementation of the resettlement of the communities affected by the Bui hydropower project and to make recommendations towards ameliorating them. The paper also discusses the role of the Chinese dam-builders and how this may have affected the Bui dam and its impacts.
Conceptual Framework
This research uses the conceptual framework of the 'Political Ecology of the Asian Drivers'. This framework is a hybrid approach that draws on the political ecology of China's engagement in overseas hydropower projects and the Asian Drivers for explaining the rise of China and its global, national and local impacts. This is outlined as follows: until very recently, the majority of earlier work on China's engagement with LMICs has been speculative (Mohan, 2008) , economistic (Jacques, 2009) , and Africa focused (Alden et al., 2008; Brautigam, 2009) . This has changed in recent years as more scholars are exploring the rise of China and its internationalisation from an environmental perspective as well as drawing on empirical data (see for example Power et al., 2012; Power, 2016; Power et al., 2016; Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013; Hensengerth, 2013; Kirchherr et al., 2016) . Understanding a complex set of international actors, interdependencies and ecological impacts necessitates a broad theoretical framework (Urban et al., 2013) .
We used the political ecology framework (Greenberg and Park, 1994; Wolf, 1972) as a basis for analysing the conflicts caused by the varied forms of control over the access to natural resources such as water and energy (Blaikie, 1985; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Peet and Watts, 2004) . The political ecology is basically concerned with nature-society relations (Perreault et al., 2015) . Power relations between different actors are at the heart of this framework (Tan-Mullins, 2007) and assessing the unequal power relations between actors allows us to explain the uneven distribution of access and control of environmental resources. Power relates to the differential ability to control and/or access the economic benefits from resource exploitation (Bryant, 1996; Dauvergne, 1994; Peluso, 1992) . Bryant and Bailey (1997) developed three fundamental assumptions in practicing political ecology in developing countries. First, costs and benefits associated with environmental change are distributed unequally. Second, this unequal distribution inevitably reinforces or reduces existing social and economic inequalities. Third, the unequal distribution of costs and benefits and the reinforcing or reducing of pre-existing inequalities holds political implications in terms of the altered power relationships that result (Bryant and Bailey, 1997) .
We combined this theoretical framework of political ecology with the distinctive approach of the 'Asian Drivers' and their impacts. This framework has already been used in an amended form to assess the motives and implications of Chinese investments in the hydropower sector in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (Urban et al., 2013) . The Asian Drivers framework developed by Humphrey and Messner (2006) , Kaplinsky and Messner (2008) and Schmitz (2006) , assesses China's direct and indirect impacts as a Rising Power and its channels of interaction with LMICs. In each of these channels -aid, trade, investment, global governance, individuals/migrants and environment -there will be a mixture of complementary and competitive economic impacts, and positive and negative impacts in relation to society and the environment (Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008) . Urban et al. (2011; 2013) advanced the Asian Drivers Framework further by addressing the motives, actors and beneficiaries in addition to impacts to analyse in detail how, why and with which impacts Chinese actors engage in LMICs.
Taken together, this framework of the 'Political Ecology of the Asian Drivers' helps us to
Methodology
The study on which this paper is based involved a number of steps. The first steps involved the realization of a stakeholder mapping to identify key stakeholders at the national, regional and district levels. In terms of occupation, the respondents were predominantly farmers and fishermen. All the interviews and FGDs were recorded, transcribed and analysed theme by theme using Nvivo 10 software. The consultation data have been analysed according to nine main themes identified during fieldwork which refer to the following issues: resettlement, life changes, involvement and consultation, interaction and communication, social (access to natural resources, livelihood changes, and access to energy) and environmental impacts, expectations, cultural impacts, compensation and challenges.
Results

The Political Ecology of the Asian Drivers and the Bui dam
The framework of the Political Ecology of the Asian Drivers indicates that for the Bui dam, the costs and benefits associated with environmental change due to the dam-building are distributed unequally. Poor local people are negatively impacted due to resettlement, declines in their livelihoods, loss of access to fertile land etc. At the same time, the Chinese developers Sinohydro and the Ghanaian state represented by the Bui Power Authority (BPA) are reaping the financial benefits of the dam. Second, this unequal distribution inevitably reinforces or reduces existing social and economic inequalities. The poor and marginalised are disproportionally affected whereas wealthy elites are gaining further power and wealth. Third, the unequal distribution of costs and benefits and the reinforcing or reducing of pre-existing inequalities holds political implications in terms of the altered power relationships that result. The close relationship between Chinese dam-builders and Ghanaian government authorities changes power relationships, meaning much closer political and trade and investment ties between China and This is the version accepted for publication in Development Policy Review published by Wiley: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-7679/issues Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23706/ Ghana after the dam construction than before. These issues, as well as the channels of interaction that China uses to engage with Ghana, will be presented in this section.
The need for the development of hydroelectricity to facilitate economic development in most developing countries has ignited heated debate about where to strike the balance between development and other important national interests. Beside their economic importance, the development of big dams, however, has been opposed due to severe environmental impacts and socioeconomic consequences (Nusser, 2003) . The state in developing hydropower dams is expected to balance the need for energy for development and protection of the environment 'due to its unique remit to act in the national interest' (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 48 as quoted in Tan (Sarpong et al., 2005; Tsikata, 2006) . For example, Gyau-Boakye (2001) estimates that more than 88,000 people were displaced and had to be resettled with many irregularities associated with the compensation schemes. The main problems included lack of property right, health and loss of artefacts with cultural and religious significance (IWMI, 2009) . Despite these challenges, successive governments in Ghana had attempted to build a third hydropower dam at Bui Gorge on the Black Volta River. The World Bank and other partners declined financial support citing social and environmental impacts, including flooding of the Bui National Park home to some rare black hippopotamus populations (Benjamin, 2007 cited in Obour et al., 2015 . With the government's determination to generate power, a solution was found when the state signed an Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) Agreement with a Chinese company (Sinohydro) and a French consultancy (Coyne et Bellier) to construct a dam at Bui (Barry et al., 2005 ).
An environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) was conducted prior to the commencement of the dam construction to satisfy both local and international requirements. The ESIA also highlighted potential adverse environmental, social and economic impacts of the project. The overriding benefit of the project was that it has the potential to enhance economic development at both the local and country level (Bui Power Authority, 2011 For the payment of the loans there is a trade agreement between China and Ghana, in that Ghana is paying back the loans to China's Exim-Bank with revenues derived from cocoa production (Dwinger, 2010; Odoom, 2015) . This means the bundling of trade, aid and investment has happened for the Bui dam deal.
The governance process for the Bui dam
Governance has been defined to refer to structures and processes that are designed to ensure accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law, stability, equity and inclusiveness, empowerment, and broad-based participation. Governance also represents the norms, values and rules of the game through which public affairs are managed in a manner that is transparent, participatory, inclusive and responsive. Governance is about the culture and institutional environment in which citizens and stakeholders interact among themselves and participate in public affairs. It is more than the organs of the government (www.unesco.org). In This analysis relates back to the conceptual framework of the Political Ecology, indicating the role of access to natural resources, the control of this access and altered power relationships with regards to resource control as key issues that are negatively impacting the local population who had to be resettled and lost access to its land.
Access to land and food
According to our analysis land is main source of concern of the affected communities. Moreover, farm, farming and fertile are also listed among the most frequent words, highlighting not only land scarcity, but also land fertility and therefore productivity as the main issues for the affected population in the resettlement areas (see Appendix 1 for selected quotes and interview codes on land access, scarcity and fertility). According to respondents, access to land has dramatically decreased after resettlement, which is causing problems either in terms of the possibility of engaging in commercial farming activities (INI-M-BUI-L) or in terms of food selfsufficiency. Community members after resettlement rely more on the market for food provision. 
but today, yam goes for ten Cedis for about three pieces" (quote from male respondent in Bui Village)
In terms of food provision, access to fish and the rise of prices of fish in the market due to immigrant workers are also a source of concern of the affected communities. Even if the expanded lake resulting from the construction of the dam has led to a general boom in the fishing business, native communities have been unable to take advantage of the booming fishing industry. There are three main challenges that resettled communities complained about access to fish and fishing activities. These are: the long distance it takes to access the river from the community; the lack of skills to fish on the new expanded lake (INI-M-AK-FH); and the fact that it is more expensive for them to buy fish now than it was before resettlement. Respondents reported that before the construction of the dam when community members were not able to catch fish they paid two Cedis to buy the amount necessary to make a meal for the whole household. After the construction of the dam, they have to pay five Cedis to get the same amount of fish (INI-F-BUI-FH). Access to bush meat for both home consumption and commercial purposes has also declined due to difficulty to access the forest from the resettled communities; villagers have to buy meat from the market now (INI-M-DK-A).
Access to water, forest products and energy
With regards to water access, water scarcity is also a problem in some of the resettlement sites, such as in the case of Jama. According to the quotes reported in Appendix 1, in Jama and Dokokyina water boreholes are not enough to satisfy the water requirement of the population, which has increased after the construction of the dam due to the presence of immigrants moving into the village (FGD-F-JAMA-W; INI-F-DK-W).
Access to forest products (such as charcoal, firewood, commercial trees) has decreased after the construction of the dam, the resettlement sites are far away from the forest and therefore In terms of energy access, energy and electricity are not a concern for the resettled communities. This is because after the construction of the dam all communities have been provided with electricity, as reported in the quote below.
"The thing we appreciate most about our coming here is that previously we didn't have electricity at the village close to the lake but now we have light" (quote from FGD with men in Jama).
Across the board, the affected population indicated that they have lost or deteriorated access to fertile land, forests and forest products and other natural resources. The Political Ecology framework links this to unequal power relations between actors resulting in the uneven distribution of access and control of environmental resources. This can be seen for the Bui dam case, where the Chinese developers Sinohydro (during construction) and most importantly the Bui Power Authority (long-term) are in control of natural resources and decide about the fate of the resettled local people. This is further manifested in livelihood changes, as discussed below.
Livelihood changes and impacts
According to the results obtained by the interviews carried out with local community members Even if they received compensation for the inundation of cashew plantations, the money they received lasted for two years only (INI-F-AK-Mb; FGD-M-BUI-Mb). Unemployment is therefore increasing. As a result, some villagers had to shift from cash crops such as cashew to other less valuable food crops such as cassava and maize. Moreover, some villagers have shifted from farming to fishing as farming is no more profitable for them (FGD-M-AK-Lb). However, problems of lack of skills and materials to fish on the lake compared to the river (FGD-M-BUIFIb), as well as the distance to access the river and lake from the new resettlement areas are also undermining the possibility of some villages to access new jobs opportunities (INI-F-AK-Fb).
Again, before the construction of the dam, smoked fish traders were able to access the river to buy fish without using a car. After the construction of the dam however, they have to go further away and they need a car. According to one respondent, they pay around two Cedis to get to the river. In the new settlements they also have to buy firewood to smoke the fish which they previously got freely from the forest. All these additional expenses have negatively impacted on their livelihoods. There are difficulties to change occupations from farming or fishing to trading, due to the lack of money to invest in the transition (FGD-F-DK-Mb). This is because in the resettlement sites communities are more dependent on the market for food provision due to the reduced access to fertile land and fishing activities.
According to our analysis, the Bui dam construction has resulted in competing uses of natural resources (such as land, fish and forest products) between: (i) different uses, i.e. land and water for dam construction and energy generation versus land and water for the provision of "This whole environment is being somehow utilised and we don't know to whose benefit. The wood that is being cut we don't control it and the revenue that comes as well".
Another District Assembly (DA) official also described these activities in these words; 
China's role as a dam-builder and financier
The conceptual framework of the Political Ecology of the Asian Drivers enables us to analyse the various channels of interaction that China uses to engage with Ghana in dam-building. These channels include aid, trade, investment, global governance, individuals/migrants and environment. Chinese actors are involved in overseas dam investments with different roles. They can act as financiers, developers, builders, as well as sub-contractors only or acting as a combination of these roles. Usually they are involved in at least two of the above tasks (Urban et al., 2013) . The Bui dam is the largest Chinese-funded project and the largest foreign investment after the Akosombo hydroelectric power project in Ghana as at 2008. As mentioned before, various channels of interaction are being used with regards to the Bui dam, namely a bundled aid, trade and investment deal is in place that links revenues from cocoa exports to paying off the dam's debt to Exim bank.
Although the Chinese have a very important role to play in terms of providing the technical expertise and funding for the dam, they did not participate in the management and implementation of the ESIA of the dam. We also found out that the Chinese did not participate in implementation of the resettlement and the mitigation plan that details measures for reducing the environmental and social implications of the dam. The ESIA had in fact been commissioned before the construction of the dam by the Ministry of Energy of Ghana and carried out by the UK firm ERM (Hensengerth, 2013; Environmental Resources Management, 2007a) . The BPA was created by the Ghanaian government for the management of the dam and its impacts, including the implementation of the resettlement plan. Our fieldwork also found that the main functions of the BPA include the generation of electrical power, the operation of the dam, the construction of a transmission system, the supply of the electrical power generated at the dam, the provision of facilities and assistance for the use of the lake created by the construction of the dam, as well as the development of activities at the dam area. The Authority is also responsible for the control of the flow of water and flooding due to the creation of the reservoir and the acquisition of land and resettlement measures, including compensation payments to the local population.
Obligations of the contractor, in this case Sinohydro, was the implementation of a Construction Management Plan (CMP), including: "workforce and local residents' health and safety; "good housekeeping" site management practices; flow regimes during construction (particularly during diversion); emergency response to significant accidents/pollution incidents; site access; siting of temporary structures/work and locations/materials sourcing. Similarly, employment and workforce policies were an obligation of the contractor, such as: health screening, and health provision for workers; workforce health awareness; employment policies, favouring employment (Environmental Resources Management, 2007b) .
Our work found that the Bui dam project in Ghana is an Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) / Turn-key Project Contract in which the construction company is responsible for the construction of the dam, including the health and safety of the workers and their recruitment, but once the infrastructure was finished and operational the host government became the immediate owner and the only one responsible for the project. In this case, even though the construction company had to abide by the regulations of the host country, including environmental regulations, the company was not responsible for the execution of the ESIA and the mitigation strategies. As the BPA is the only authority responsible for the implementation of the environmental and social mitigation measures and monitoring of Sinohydro's conduct, various concerns have been raised about the lack of proper forms of control and supervision over BPA and Sinohydro's activities to assure a more transparent and effective application of social and environmental regulations and standards (Hensengerth, 2011) . However, in the long-term it is the BPA that manages, operates, maintains the dam and deals with its impacts, such as resettlement and compensation of the affected population. The role of Chinese actors like Sinohydro and ExIm Bank is therefore limited.
Conclusion
We used the conceptual framework of the Political Ecology of the Asian Drivers to assess China's engagement in the dams sector in Ghana and its impacts. We analysed how costs and benefits associated with dam-building are distributed unequally, with poor people losing more and wealthy elites gaining more. The research indicated how this unequal distribution inevitably reinforces or reduces existing social and economic inequalities and how this altered the power relationships between China and Ghana and led to a tighter political and economic relationship between the two countries. This research found that China uses various channels of interaction to engage with Ghana in dam-building, most importantly a bundled aid, trade and investment deal that links revenues from Ghanaian cocoa exports to China for paying off the dam's debt to Exim bank.
The analysis shows that the Bui dam project has on balance had more costly than beneficial effects on the resettled communities. The limited access to various forms of natural resources has resulted in limited livelihood opportunities for virtually all categories of people in the resettled communities. The lack of access to adequate land of appreciable fertility has greatly reduced the possibilities for enhanced food as well as commercial crop production with serious implications for achieving food security and poverty reduction. The irrigation project promised the resettled communities has not materialised and information obtained from the field indicate the project is to be moved to another district, very distant from the resettled communities. The resettled fishing communities have not fared any better as their communities are located too far from their main source of livelihood-the lake, making journeys to and from the lake for fishing too expensive and making fishing an unprofitable livelihood activity. Worse of all, the creation of the lake has provided them with the opportunity for an enhanced livelihood, yet, they do not have the requisite fishing gear and the skills to fish on the large and open expanse of water and therefore are unable to benefit fully from a resource that was supposed to inure to their benefit and improve their livelihoods. They therefore urgently need to be given the requisite training in the techniques of fishing on the lake that they were promised during the planning of the resettlement but which has not materialised.
Opportunities for livelihood diversification are also limited. While the farmers among the resettlers, who for lack of access to adequate amount of fertile land for farming may wish to diversify into fishing, they are constrained by lack of fishing skills, lack of resources to acquire the appropriate fishing gear and also the long and expensive distance from their community to the lake side. The fishermen equally cannot engage in farming either. Trading seems to be an attractive form of livelihood diversification but lack of capital was found to be the limiting factor. Based on the above it could be concluded that there is a cost to all the previous livelihood activities of people of the resettled communities. On the other hand, the BPA reneged on two promises to the communities during the planning phase of the Bui project: new skills training and provision of new infrastructure to support existing livelihoods particularly farming. The inability of BPA to implement the skills training programme resulted in reduced livelihood opportunities and led to huge migration of the youth from the resettled communities.
In terms of livelihoods then, the dam project seems to have deepened the pre-existing poverty situation of the communities. It seems the dam has rather benefited more the fishermen and fishmongers from outside the resettled communities (some from Burkina Faso, Niger and, Nigerian) on account of their skills in fishing on the lake and cash resources to be able to engage in fishing more profitably. This has economic and social-cultural consequences for the resettled communities. It is recommended that the BPA implements fully the terms of the RAF including alternative jobs training and other livelihood assistance packages to better the livelihoods of the resettled communities.
The Ghanaian government has negotiated a favourable turn-key (or EPC) contract with Chinese dam-builders Sinohydro and Chinese financiers. In addition, the Ghanaian government established the BPA, a separate entity that manages the dam and its impacts, including resettlement and compensations. Sinohydro does therefore not make any decisions on the dams' management, but relies on very clear cut roles of responsibility and decision-making held by a Ghanaian authority. We therefore draw two conclusions from the analysis of the role of Chinese 
